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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BENJAMIN N. RYAN,

)

Third-Party Plaintiff Respondent,

)
)

Case No. 14293

-vs. )

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)

Third-Party Defendant Appellant.

)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for a judicial determination that third-party plaintiff
was an insured person under the terms of third-party defendant's policy of
liability insurance while driving the insured vehicle.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Bryant H. Croft, District Judge, granted third-party
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, in so doing holding that third-party
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plaintiff was an insured person under the terms of third-party

defendant's

policy

of automobile liability insurance while driving the insured vehicle under the
conditions which gave rise to this cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the Summary Judgment of the
Court

District

affirmed.
STATEMENT

OF FACTS

On the evening of December 22, 1972, Christopher
obtained the use of a 1969 Dodge Dart owned by his father,
the stated purpose of going out with some friends.

Ryan, age 16,
Earl F. Ryan,

At approximately

Christopher

Ryan picked up Ronald Nez, age 18, Mike Edvalson,

third-party

plaintiff Benjamin N. Ryan, age 18, (no relation).

Ryan had permission

for

9:00 p. m.,

age 18, and
Christopher

from his father Earl F. Ryan to take the vehicle out for

the evening as is shown by his affidavit in the form of a sworn statement
was taken by an insurance adjuster for third-party
presence of Earl F. Ryan shortly after the accident.
in the sworn statement

of Christopher

defendant Allstate
The following

in the
appears

Ryan, at page 4, line 3:

Q. And at that time did you ask your father's
permission
to use the car ?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Can you describe for me how you did it ? Can you
describe what you said to him and what your father
said to you when you asked him to use the car? Did
he put any limitations on your use of the car?
A. No.
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which

Q. (Mrs. Ryan): Well Christopher?
A. He said be back by 1:00.
Q. Did he say anything about who could drive the car?
A. Yes, just me.
And at page 4, line 15:
Q. Did he say anything about where you could go or
where you could not go ?
A. No.
Q. Did he put any limitations on you as to how far
you could go, or anything like that?
A. No, as long as I paid for the gas.
At approximately

midnight,

the boys were at a bowling alley on South

State Street and were preparing to leave for another bowling alley.

At that

time Benjamin N. Ryan asked if he could drive to the next bowling alley, and
Christopher
alleys,

Ryan allowed him to do so.

During the trip between the two bowling

Benjamin Ryan was involved in an accident with another vehicle

in one death and serious injuries to an occupant of the other vehicle.

resulting
Allstate

Insurance Company denied coverage to Benjamin Ryan based upon the named
insured9s restriction

that no one but Christopher

was to drive the car.

The omnibus clause of the ^policy of liability insurance that was issued
to Earl F. Ryan states as follows:
this

n

The following persons are insured

under

part:n
1.

The named insured with respect to the owned or nonowned
automobile;

2. Any resident of the named insured's
to the owned automobile;

household with

respect

3. Any other person with respect to the owned automobile
provided the actual use thereof is with the permission of
the named insured;
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4. Any relative with respect to a nonowned private
passenger
automobile or trailer not regularly furnished for the use
of such relative; and,
5. Any other person or organization with respect to any
automobile or trailer provided:
(a) The actual use is by a person who is an insured
under any of the four preceeding
paragraphs,
with respect to such automobile or trailer, and
(b) Such other person or organization is legally
responsible for the use and except with respect
to a temporary substitute automobile does not
own or hire the automobile or trailer.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PERMISSION GRANTED BY THE NAMED INSURED
EARL F. RYAN, FOR USE OF THE INSURED AUTOMOBILE, ENCOMPASSED THE USE TO WHICH IT WAS BEING PUT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, AND THUS
BENJAMIN N. RYAN WAS COVERED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE AT THE TIME OF
THE ACCIDENT.
It is generally

held that although the named insured has

prohibited

the use of the vehicle by a third party, such prohibition shall not be held to
preclude recovery

under the omnibus

dause where,

is riding in the car with the second permittee
The second permittee
permittee.

permittee

at the time of the accident,

or (2)

in using the vehicle is serving some purpose of the original

The reasoning which the courts have adopted in arriving at these

rulings is that the second permittee
first

(1) The original

permittee

is,

n

operatingrr the car for the ,rusen of the

and such "use" is within the coverage of the omnibus

4 ALR3d 68, Section 12(b).
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clause.

The Honorable Judge Croft points out in his memorandum
granting third-party

plaintiff's

decision

Motion for Summary Judgment that an omnibus

clause such as the one involved in the case at bar speaks in terms of the "use"
of the vehicle,

not its "operation. " As the Court states:

"This provision of

the policy does not limit coverage to only those persons who drive with the
owner's permission
permission.

"

but requires

In Allstate

180 A2d 168 (N.J.),

only that the use of the car be with the owner's

Insurance Company vs. Fidelity and Casualty

Company,

which presented a fact situation very similar to the instant

case, the named insured knew that other young people would be in the vehicle
and gave his son permission

to use it to attend an evening basketball game.

named insured cautioned his son not to allow anyone else to drive;
during a stop to pick up one of the passengers
unlicensed fifteen year-old

the son attempted to teach an

The court held that the named

injunction to his son against allowing anyone else to drive was not a
factor and that the second permittee
The court further

to use the vehicle encompassed

son with his father's

but in violation of instructions
drive,

significant

stated that the omnibus clause refers to the "use"

Loffler vs. Boston Insurance Company,
insured's

insured's

was entitled to coverage as an additional

of the car and not to its operation and that the original permittee's
permission

however,

companion how to operate the car and the companion

lost control and struck a pedestrian.

insured.

The

permission
permitted

unrestricted

the very use to which he put it.

120 A2d 621 (D.C.),

In

where the named

obtained the car for use on a "date"
his date, an unlicensed operator,

to

the court held that the car ivas still being used by the son for the very
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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purpose for which permission had been granted, namely for

rt

datingn purposes.

The court stated that if the insurer wished to avoid liability under such circumstances it should have inserted the word "operated" in the clause which provided
coverage while the automobile was being "used" by the named insured or with
his permission.

And in National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. vs.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , (D. C. Mont) 277 F. Supp. 542, (applying
Montana law), the court found the insurer liable even though the named insured
had expressly forbidden his daughter to permit others to drive the car, where
the accident occurred while the daughter's friend was driving with the daughter's
permission,

because the friend's vehicle was attached to a trailer used to

transport the daughter's horse to a parade.

The court found that the insured's

permission was implied since the car was being driven for the purpose, benefit
and advantage of his daughter.
There is a substantial policy reason for construing the standard omnibus
clause broadly in favor of the insured and injured.

This is to effectuate the

strong legislative policy of assuring financial protection for innocent victims of
automobile accidents, reflected by statutory requirements in all states,

including

Utah, of adequate liability coverages for all vehicles operated on the highways.
This policy underlies most of the decisions upholding coverage under circumstances such as these.

For example, in Indemnity Insurance Company vs.

Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company, 166 A2d 355 (N.J.),

the court

made a broad construction for the purpose of effectuating the comprehensive
scheme of the New Jersey Motor vehicle legislation, stating that the insurance
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

policy provision only called for permission
of the vehulc

to "r~rn —* ^r ';,

and thai thu^c words were not synonymous

broader in denoting the employment
while the latter referred

io the

operation''

/''*• toma1* hvhiti>

of the < m ; <. - /*•* purpose of the user

manipulate

Other courts which have afforded protection to the second
under the omnibus clause,

permittee

even though the named insured had prohibited the

original pei miiiee f? om allowii i g othei s io drive, have also done so when
there was a finding that the first permittee

was riding in the car or was bene-

Jiied h\ its ()/* lation In lUc sr< <md pa m*tt\ < , and the - •
used was within the scope of the initial permission.
Miesmer,

24 i) A'V.S 87\ |.

;

vhich it was being

Hanover Ins. Co.,

Pollard vs. Safeco Ins. * .,

vs.

•• *-' - ~vfl

(Tenn); Brooks & Delta Fire & Casualty Co , 82 So, 2t;<J 5.f (La); Metcalf
Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co.,
Ins. Co. vs.. Williamson,

126 NW2d 471 (Nt >b); State Farm Mut.

331 F.2d 517 (applying Ariz,

vs.

Auto.

law); Schneck vs.

Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co., 119 NW2d 342 (Wis); Allstate Ins. Co. vs.
Nationwide Mut. hi^. Lu. » n71 A?d ?0l f1)cl)} Strickland vs. Georgia

Casualty

& Surety Co , 162 SE2d 421 (Ga); Mullin vs. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 136
NW2d 612 (A linn); Uisintin vs. County Mutual lusurame

Co, , 222 NE2d 550

(III).

use the vehicle for recreational
friends

purposes,

to various bowling alleys

original permittee

a passenger

which would include driving with his

Ai M'/i iane oi iiiv m ulciti «ol' tmfy n

in the vehicle,

I<

but the vehicle tvas also being
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used for his benefit.

Therefore,

it is clear that the requirements for

coverage to the second permittee were met; namely,

extending

(1) that the use to which

the vehicle was being put was within the scope of the original permission,
that the first permittee

(2)

was a passenger in the vehicle and (3) that the vehicle

was being used for the benefit of the first

permittee.

POINT II
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON FILE TO
JUSTIFY THE LOWER COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMAR Y JUDGMENT ON THIS ISSUE.
The only issue presented by this third-party
of third-party

plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was whether third-

party defendant's liability insurance
plaintiffs
action.

action and the hearing

n

omnibus11 clause covered

third-party

liability at the time of the accident which gave rise to this cause of
The only evidence needed to decide this issue was on record at the

time of the hearing.
policy provisions,

That evidence consisted of (I) a copy of the applicable
(2) a sworn affidavit in the form of a statement given by

Christopher Ryan, the son of the named insured, in the named

insured's

presence on December 28, 1972; and (3) the uncontroverted fact that the accident which gave rise to this cause of action occurred after Christopher

Ryan

obtained permission from his father to take the vehicle and while the vehicle
was being operated by third-party
Ryan as

plaintiff Benjamin N. Ryan with

passenger.

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Christopher

The affidavit submitted
hearing of third-party

plaintiff's

by opposing counsel from Earl Ryan at the
Motion for Summary Judgment and approxi-

mately 2 1/2 years after Christopher Ryan's affidavit,

does not raise any

factual issues precluding resolution of the matter by summary judgment
the following reasons:

First,

of his son's sworn statement

Mr. Earl Ryan was in attendance at the taking
and made no comment,

when his son stated that he had permission

correction

or objection

to take the car for the evening;

and second, Mr. Earl Ryan does not deny in his affidavit that he gave
sion to his son Christopher

for

permis-

to use the car.

Even if the affidavit of Earl Ryan raised a genuine issue as to any
fact material to the court's decision,

which it does not, consideration

affidavit is precluded by Rule 56(c), which requires

that opposing

of the

affidavits

be served prior to the date of hearing.
The law, as capably outlined in Judge Croft's memorandum
is clear that if Christopher

Ryan was given permission

decision

to fruse" the car and

if, at the time of the accident Christopher Ryan was in the car or the car was
being driven for some purpose or benefit of Christopher Ryan, the car was
being "used" by him within the meaning of the "omnibus" clause and coverage
would extend to the driver,

in this case Benjamin

Ryan.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments and authorities as cited herein,
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respondent

respectfully requests the court to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully

submitted,

WILLIAM J. CAYIAS
Attorney for Third-Party Plaintiff
1558 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
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